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Abstract 
It is increasingly recognised within high-consequence industries that a positive safety culture 
is strongly linked to various safety outcomes and performance indicators. Explosive ordnance 
(EO) is an area that demands a high level of safety culture, indeed it is a reputational and 
operational necessity.  This paper introduces  a measure of safety climate tailored to the EO 
domain. The paper describes the background to the study, the development of items, and the 
subsequent factorial validation of scales on the basis of a sample of 272 EO personnel.  The 
factor structure that emerged was very similar to the postulated structure of 14 climate 
dimensions.  These 14 dimensions were shown to represent three meta-themes in the data: 
Safety Awareness and Responsibility (8 subscales), Safety Resources issues (3 subscales), 
and Safety System issues (3 subscales).  The authors are confident that the EO Safety Survey 
is a valid, reliable and powerful tool that will support the goal of holistic reform of the EO 
domain.  The EO Safety Survey will inform and enable tailored safety intervention efforts, 
improved compliance monitoring, and benchmarking studies that, collectively, will enhance 
the management of the human factors issues that impact on EO work. 
Introduction 
 Safety in explosive ordnance is a reputational and operational necessity.  The 
regulation of EO has a long history, dating back to the eleventh century when gunpowder was 
first imported to the West from China. While it is hoped that catastrophic damage and loss of 
life from EO mishaps are unlikely, it is apparent that even small safety incidents can have 
potentially strategic implications for Defence.  Such events can trigger suspensions of 
equipment use, suspensions and reviews of training, and detailed, costly and time-consuming 
investigations.  The conduct of operations can also be affected. 
 It is increasingly recognised within high-consequence industries that a positive safety 
culture is strongly linked to various safety outcomes and performance indicators.  This 
interest in safety culture is associated with the need to transform “the way people do 
business” to more desirable - and safety-friendly – states.  In aviation, the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation has mandated that all member states must implement safety 
management systems.  Further, these safety management systems must include a component 
aimed at improving safety culture.  Many other high-risk industries are following aviation's 
lead by seeking to assess and improve safety culture.  Safety culture is a relatively new area 
of research so our understanding of safety culture is still evolving, as are the tools used to 
assess it. 
 Reason (1997) proposed that an organisation with an effective safety culture: a) has a 
safety information system that collects, analyses and disseminates information from incidents 
and near misses; b) has a reporting culture where people are prepared to report their errors, 
mistakes and violations; c) has a culture of trust; d) is flexible and able to adapt to changing 
cirumstances; e) is willing to implement reform when it is required. 
 While culture is regarded as quite stable, climate is considered quite dynamic.  
Nevertheless, climate is considered easier to measure because it comprises those elements - 
attitudes, perceptions, opinions and behaviours – that psychologists and sociologists have 
been measuring for decades (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flynn, 2001).  Safety climate, because it is 
more amenable to measurement, and precisely because it is more ephemeral, is considered 
the logical target for safety interventions.  Safety climate can predict safety outcomes 
(Johnson, 2007).  Given the multifaceted, multilevel complexity of safety climate, multiple 
measurement methods are recommended to generate comprehensive understanding. 
 A task to develop a measure of safety climate tailored to the EO domain was 
commenced in the Australian Defence Force in March 2010.  The main aims of this measure 
include the ability to: a) compare scores across sections of the organisation to determine 
where intervention efforts should be directed (graphical representation provided); b) obtain 
qualitative data for improving compliance with EO procedures; and c) collect information 
that will, over time, provide benchmark data that can be used to help manage human factors 
issues that have an impact on EO work. 
Method 
 Components of the task included: a) the conduct of focus groups with EO operators 
and subject matter experts; b) the design and pilot testing of the EO Safety Survey; c) the 
review of existing safety performance data; d) administration of the survey in May 2010; and 
e) analysis of the data from the returned surveys. 
 Themes that emerged during the focus group sessions included documentation issues; 
inadequate manning, downsizing, and insufficient resources (resulting in high, stressful and, 
in some cases, potentially unsafe workloads); outdated EO policy and procedures; declining 
basic knowledge and awareness of EO; situational and occupational differences; a perceived 
decline in the organisation’s inbuilt defences that mitigate mistakes and errors before they 
lead to incidents; unqualified personnel being used in EO roles; management pressure to get 
things done, administrative decision-making in ignorance of EO technicalities, training 
issues, and communication concerns.   
 The Explosive Ordnance Safety Culture Survey (EOSCS) was based on a literature 
review, the focus group outcomes, and the professional experience of the consultants in 
designing and administering surveys of this kind in military aviation, mining, construction, 
and civil health settings (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Murphy, 2009).  
 The EOSCS comprised five sections: a) background information on employment 
status, years of explosive ordnance experience, main and secondary explosive ordnance 
role(s), work satisfaction, and job intentions; b) the second section contained a 78-item scale 
measuring 14 dimensions of safety attitudes, perceptions and behaviours and a 10-item error 
scale; c) section three of the survey contained 20 items drawn largely from the focus group 
discussions that were intended to measure attitudes to topical issues related to explosive 
ordnance safety; d) the fourth section included variables often associated with safety 
including measures of workplace morale and cohesion, fatigue, various health indicators, 
including psychological status, and some basic demographic items; e) the final section of the 
survey provided a page for written comments about any aspect of the survey.  
 
 A total of 272 surveys were administered. Four surveys were discarded during 
verification and a further 31 surveys were excluded from the current round of analyses 
because the respondents lacked meaningful exposure to explosive ordnance.   
Results 
 Following data screening procedures, Principal Axis Factoring methods embedded in 
the SPSS programme were used to assess the dimensionality of the instrument. Horn’s (1965) 
parallel analysis routines were used to determine the number of factors to extract and axes 
were permitted to rotate to oblique positions. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was used as to 
estimate internal consistency reliability. The EO Safety Climate Scale proved to be a valid 
and reliable measure.  The factor structure that emerged from analysis of the items was very 
similar to the postulated structure of 14 climate dimensions.  These dimensions were: Safety 
Communication, Safety Awareness, Quality of Supervision, Willingness to Report, 
Organisational Compliance, Manageable Workload, Adequacy of Resources, Consequences 
of Mistakes (‘just culture’), Individual Compliance, Training Standards, Quality of 
Documentation, Excessive Documentation, Audit Comprehensiveness and Safety 
Commitment.  These 14 dimensions were shown to represent three meta-themes in the data: 
Safety Awareness and Responsibility (8 subscales), Safety Resources issues (3 subscales), 
and Safety System issues (3 subscales).   
Conclusions 
 The authors are confident that the EO Safety Survey is a valid, reliable and powerful 
tool that will support the goal of holistic reform of the EO domain.  The EO Safety Survey 
will inform and enable tailored safety intervention efforts, improved compliance monitoring, 
and benchmarking studies that, collectively, will enhance the management of the human 
factors issues that impact on EO work 
 Safety climate and culture need to be underpinned by an awareness of relevant safety 
and human performance concepts so that a shared language relating to safety management is 
developed.  There would appear to be scope to increase the awareness of human factors and 
safety management systems across the Defence explosive ordnance domain. As mentioned 
above, human factors training is now mandatory in aviation. Safety systems must also be 
underpinned by an effective reporting system, willingness to report, and a ‘just culture’ that 
promotes individual and corporate safety responsibilities.   
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